Niger's Mines Minister Ousmane Abarchi met representatives of Rosatom subsidiaries Uranium One Group and TENEX in Niamey on October 1, 2026. Journal du Niger reported the meeting <cite index="1-6,1-7">did not result in the announcement of a new contract, but was instead aimed at assessing progress on projects planned under a memorandum of understanding signed between Niger's Mines Ministry and Uranium One Group</cite>. The outlet added that <cite index="1-8,1-9">the official communiqué specified neither the exact nature of the projects concerned, nor their location, nor the sums envisaged, and made no mention of any decision taken at the end of the meeting</cite>. RTEN Français separately confirmed the same framing, describing the gathering as a review of ongoing cooperation in Niger's uranium sector.
The meeting followed Prime Minister Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine's September 26 address to the UN General Assembly's 81st session, in which, according to La Nouvelle Tribune, he <cite index="13-3">leveled a new accusation against Paris: that at the moment of its departure from Niger, France had deliberately disorganized operations at the country's uranium sites</cite>. The outlet noted that <cite index="13-4">France had not yet responded to the accusation</cite>, leaving the claim as an unverified allegation from a single party.
La Nouvelle Tribune and other outlets report that roughly 1,000 tonnes of uranium concentrate have been moved from the Somaïr mine to Niamey and offered for sale. A Nasdaq report drawing on the Financial Times put the figure similarly, noting <cite index="7-1">a stockpile of 1,000 metric tons of uranium seized from a French-operated mine in Niger is now sitting at a military airbase in Niamey</cite>, and that <cite index="7-2">the uranium... has been offered for sale by Niger's military government but remains unsold</cite>. This sits in direct tension with a September 2025 ICSID ruling: Orano's own statement confirms the tribunal <cite index="38-3">ordered the State of Niger not to sell, transfer, or even facilitate the transfer to third parties of the uranium produced by SOMAÏR that was withheld in violation of Orano's rights</cite>. Orano has said it <cite index="38-7">reserves the right to initiate any additional actions, including criminal ones, against third parties if there is any preemption of the matter in violation of its lifting rights</cite> — and the company has since followed through: a Paris prosecutor opened a formal investigation in December 2025 into suspected organized theft of the uranium "in the interests of a foreign power," a probe Niger's government has firmly rejected, with Mines Minister Abarchi stating the country cannot be accused of stealing a resource it legally owns.
Abarchi has publicly said Niger can sell its uranium to whoever it chooses. As reported by the Financial Times and relayed by Nasdaq, he stated: <cite index="7-8,7-9,7-10,7-11">"We can sell to whoever we want," adding that Niger would only deal with buyers it considered responsible. "We are talking with the Russians. We are talking to the Chinese. We are talking to the Americans."</cite> Estimates of the stockpile's value cluster around $200-240 million, though exact tonnage figures vary modestly across sources, and no outlet has confirmed that any sale to a Russian buyer has actually been completed, as opposed to merely offered.
The realignment extends beyond commerce. On September 9, 2026, Niger voted with Russia and China against an IAEA Board of Governors resolution referring Iran to the UN Security Council over its nuclear program. The board <cite index="21-3,21-4">adopted the resolution by 23 votes in favour, three votes against and eight abstentions... Russia, China and Niger voted against it</cite>. This continues a pattern: Niger joined Russia and China in opposing a similar IAEA resolution on Iran in November 2025 as well.
This diplomatic and commercial pivot follows Niger's 2025 nationalization of Orano's Somaïr mine, ending a French uranium relationship dating to 1971, during which Orano and its predecessor held a majority stake in the mine and marketed the bulk of Niger's historical uranium output, according to Nigerien authorities.
What remains unconfirmed is any independent Rosatom, Uranium One or TENEX statement detailing specific financial commitments from the October 1 meeting, and whether the contested uranium has actually changed hands for payment. Watch for developments in the Paris criminal investigation and Orano's arbitration, any IAEA or Western buyer response to the stockpile's continued relocation, and whether Niger discloses concrete terms with any of its stated three suitors — Russia, China or the United States.