S&P judges Burkina Faso less likely to miss debt payments even as the country’s war continues. The explanation is not that the war has become affordable. Stronger revenues, continued access to regional borrowing and support from international lenders have given the state more room to meet competing demands. Keeping that room will become harder if increasingly expensive debt absorbs more of its income.
S&P’s 6 November upgrade, from CCC+ to B- for long-term debt, rests on eased liquidity risks: the danger that Burkina might lose access to regional reserves or financing. The agency cites administrative continuity and full, timely commercial debt payments alongside access to the West African bond market and multilateral support. Its judgment is about the government’s ability and willingness to pay, not a verdict that insecurity has ceased to damage the country.
The pressure falls on the same treasury: scheduled debt payments must be found alongside money for forces on the ground, public investment and protection against rising costs. Stronger collections and open financing channels have allowed the government to expand its spending plans while staying current with commercial creditors. That accommodation has costs of its own.
More revenue, more spending
This year’s budget response challenges the simplest explanation for improved creditworthiness: that the government must be squeezing expenditure to keep lenders happy.
The IMF’s 4 November assessment says strong first-half revenues supported a supplementary budget increasing spending, particularly public investment, while retaining the authorities’ original deficit target. Fund staff expect the deficit could exceed that target, but remain below the larger ceiling agreed in June. Higher revenues have allowed larger spending plans without an equivalent increase in the planned deficit.
There is evidence of stronger collections beyond projections. Reporting on the government’s September budget review, NetAfrique put first-half receipts at roughly CFA1.97 trillion, against CFA1.56 trillion a year earlier. The figures are the government’s account of its collections.
Mining revenues are part of that breathing room. But the state has also built a war-financing mechanism that reaches beyond mines. In June, the prime minister said the Patriotic Support Fund had collected about CFA162 billion since the start of the year to support the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland and forces on the ground.
The financing is not simply voluntary patriotism. APA’s account of the same official figures identifies business levies, a special contribution on profits and telecommunications and television collections, alongside donations. Libreinfo reported a 5% contribution on prepaid mobile services, citing the finance ministry. War finance thus draws on ordinary commercial activity as well as resource income. How much operators pass on to customers remains unknown.
The price of staying current
Access to borrowing provides another way to reconcile today’s demands. Burkina remains connected to the shared West African monetary and debt system even as insecurity persists. The joint World Bank–IMF debt assessment issued earlier this year describes how easier regional liquidity and monetary easing facilitated sovereign issuance. An improvement need not come solely from a change inside Burkina: the pool of available regional finance matters too.
That access comes with a growing constraint. S&P estimates that concessional debt—borrowing on favourable terms—fell to 36% of the total by June 2026, from 46% in 2019. It expects greater reliance on more expensive regional financing and interest costs around a tenth of government revenue. Money absorbed by interest cannot simultaneously fund another public priority.
Short maturities add a different pressure: the need to persuade investors to lend again. The earlier Bank–Fund assessment found that Treasury instruments’ average maturity had shortened between 2022 and 2024, with the bill-heavy pattern continuing into the first half of 2025. Much prospective borrowing would repay maturing debt, rather than supply fresh spending money. Yet the assessment also judged rollover risks contained under its regional-liquidity assumptions. Frequent refinancing is a vulnerability, not evidence that default is imminent.
The spending expansion matters: improved creditworthiness has not required an across-the-board spending freeze. But budget allocations are not delivered services, and continued debt payments do not mean all wartime needs have been met.
Durable revenue growth and longer, cheaper financing would strengthen this accommodation. Weaker mining receipts, higher security costs or tighter regional financing would strain it. The IMF already identifies higher petroleum costs as a drain on public finances and food-security pressures as a reason to protect vulnerable people. A sustained rise in those costs would leave less room for the investment expansion now in the budget, unless revenues or affordable financing rose with it.