Feature | Economics & Livelihoods Analyst
Halima Ibrahim received the money. Spending it was another matter.
The displaced mother told Darfur24 in September that 780,000 Sudanese pounds in humanitarian assistance had reached her through a banking app. To buy food in Al Daein, the capital of East Darfur, she transferred the balance to a money-conversion centre. It handed her 468,000 pounds in notes. The remaining 312,000—40% of the original payment—went in conversion charges.
Shopkeepers would not accept electronic payments, she said. Her children needed food.
Her account exposes a second obstacle beyond getting assistance or family money into a war zone: turning that balance into something the next person will accept. Across western Sudan’s trading links with Chad, the form of money can change what it buys. A bank balance, Sudanese notes and the Central African CFA francs used in Chad do not pass from hand to hand at equal value.
The price of usable money
In El Geneina, West Darfur’s capital near the Chadian border, Atar reported in August three quotations for the same 1,000 CFA francs: about 40,000 Sudanese pounds in large-denomination notes, 43,000 in smaller notes, or 48,000 through Bankak, the Bank of Khartoum’s payment app.
The franc’s usefulness extended beyond money-changing. Merchants told Atar they used it as a store of value; some priced goods in francs. Khalil Ahmed Omer, a West Darfur trade and finance official, explained the commercial pull: food and consumer goods bought through Adré, the Chadian border town, were purchased in that currency. A shop selling to Sudanese customers still needed money its suppliers would take.
The currency here is the Central African CFA franc, not the separate West African CFA franc used in countries including Mali and Niger. Its growing local role described by Atar was a response to trade and monetary disruption, not a formal replacement of Sudan’s pound.
War has also damaged the machinery that keeps notes usable. In a May report, researcher Suliman Baldo of Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker described Darfur’s reliance on old banknotes without normal replacement through the central bank. Interviews conducted between September 2025 and February 2026 underpinned that account. Notes wore down while the institutions that once replenished them had broken apart.
Currency reform added another boundary. Baldo described new-note exchanges that excluded areas held by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and countermeasures by the RSF’s allied administration restricting newer notes. Cash was not merely scarce: which notes could circulate depended on who controlled the territory.
That leaves room for both costly intermediation and market power. Cash demand from trade, disruptions to apps and the concentration of notes among big dealers all appear in local accounts. They do not establish how much of a particular charge was unavoidable cost and how much was profit extracted from someone with little choice.
Paying without cash
Nor did every purchase require converting a balance into banknotes first.
A week after Halima’s account, trader Mohamed al-Zein described another arrangement in Nyala, South Darfur’s capital. A 25kg sack of flour cost 135,000 pounds in cash, or 175,000 through Bankak, he told Darfur24 on 21 September. He linked food-price pressures to the foreign currencies used for imports, including the CFA franc and the dollar.
That was a different market, not an alternative demonstrably available to Halima. But it shows why accepting digital payment does not automatically remove the loss of purchasing power: the difference can appear in the shop’s price instead of a conversion centre’s deduction.
In that trader’s September quotation, the flour was available either way. Paying through the app added 40,000 pounds to the price of the same sack.
