Analysis | Security & Conflict Analyst
JNIM’s expansion from Mali and Burkina Faso towards the Gulf of Guinea is not a single advancing front. The al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin coalition can benefit from entering a country without immediately turning it into another war zone. Access to commerce and places to recuperate may be worth preserving; a new campaign brings another army into the fight.
That calculation helps explain uneven expansion, but not by itself. Local commanders can want battles their leaders would rather avoid, while stronger state protection can make attacks harder. Historical evidence from Côte d’Ivoire shows these forces interacting—not a choice between crediting the government and studying the insurgents.
A battle the leadership reportedly opposed
In June 2020, presumed JNIM fighters killed 14 Ivorian troops at Kafolo, a village near Burkina Faso. A contemporary ACLED analysis placed the assault after a joint Ivorian–Burkinabè operation that had dismantled a militant base and recovered weapons. State forces had inflicted a real setback, but not eliminated the capacity to retaliate.
A Crisis Group report published in February 2026 adds an organisational explanation. Drawing on retrospective interviews, it describes the raid as a local commander’s initiative, partly to avenge a deputy’s death and demonstrate resilience. The leadership reportedly signalled disapproval by temporarily withdrawing the commander from the front.
That account is not an authenticated internal order. But the reported sanction matters: it suggests that an attack across a frontier need not express a unanimous decision to open a national campaign. Conversely, further attacks in 2021 and early 2022 show why the episode cannot establish either permanent restraint or complete headquarters control.
JNIM combines strategic supervision with considerable local initiative. A local unit may gain recruits, resources and prestige by expanding. Senior leaders must also consider the fighters diverted from existing fronts, the reliability of new affiliates and the risk of retaliation. The same organisation can therefore generate pressure both to cross a border and to stop short.
The state is not a spectator
An explanation centred entirely on insurgent restraint would overlook what Côte d’Ivoire actually did.
In an October 2024 assessment, researcher Denis Tull documented expanded security deployments, upgraded equipment and pooled intelligence, alongside vocational training and small-business support. These were more than announcements. Yet he also reported officials’ uncertainty about how much the decline in attacks owed to their policies rather than other causes.
The benefits were concrete for some residents. AFP’s reporting from Kafolo, published in October 2024, described reopened businesses. Trader Lamissa Traoré said a loan and grant had helped him restart trading and send two more children to school. Village chief Tiémogo Bamba credited the soldiers’ presence with restoring confidence and allowing agriculture to resume.
Those accounts support a genuine improvement in daily security; they do not isolate which intervention prevented which attack. Nor does a training programme’s existence prove that it stopped recruitment.
Deterrence and insurgent restraint can reinforce each other. Better protection raises the cost of attacking; access to useful commercial networks increases what a group might lose by provoking a crackdown. Limited local capability is another possible restraint. The absence of attacks alone cannot tell these explanations apart.
Quiet is not the same as absence
Crisis Group’s February report contrasts more sustained fighting in Benin and Togo with places militants valued for less conspicuous activity. Its argument is that economic access and fallback interests can discourage confrontation—not that every quiet border rests on a secret agreement.
For civilians, even a real reduction in attacks can leave important freedoms missing. In the same 2024 AFP report, Traoré said he had not visited relatives across the border since the Kafolo attack. Bamba described lost cross-border markets and fear of both jihadists and Burkina Faso’s civilian military auxiliaries. Business could reopen locally while a wider trading world remained inaccessible.
These dated cases do not establish November 2026 conditions across the region. They reveal why uneven expansion is possible: JNIM’s internal bargains interact with state resistance and the economic value of avoiding another battlefield. For civilians, a broader test of security is not simply whether a group attacks, but whether people can work, travel and trade without its coercion—or abusive protection from its opponents.
